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Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining 
Suggestions for Emerging Democracies in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
Harry C. Katz, Sarosh Kuruvilla, and Lowell Turner 
 
Introduction 
This paper provides lessons for industrial relations reform efforts in the new nations emerging 
from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. Our purpose is to identify the basic industrial-
relations practices that enable the advanced industrial countries to compete in world markets. 
The paper does not provide a detailed descriptive account of the existing industrial-relations 
institutions in the formerly communist countries, nor does it assess the likely short-run 
consequences of the economic restructuring under way across the new nations. Rather, our 
focus is on the experiences in the advanced economies and the lessons those experiences 
contain regarding successful industrial-relations practice. 
 
Two Key Assumptions 
Two key assumptions guide our approach: one concerns the likely course of economic 
development in the new democracies, and the other involves the recent changes in industrial 
relations that are occurring in the advanced industrialized countries. 
 
The Need to Come Up to World Standards in Economic and Industrial-Relations Practice 
 
The reason we draw lessons from the advanced industrialized economies is that we believe 
the new democracies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc will have to come up to 
world standards rapidly in order to sustain significant economic growth. The experiences of 
Third World countries in recent years shows that import-substitution development strategies 
that were associated with the protection of domestic producers have not led to rapid 
development. Rather, the more rapid developers have been those countries (such as Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore) that have entered export markets quickly and forcibly. In the rapid 
developers, given the heightened demands of world competition for quality and production 
flexibility, export success has required adoption of state-of-the-art production techniques. 
Perhaps most important is the lesson learned from recent rapid developers—that modern and 
competitive production requires modern industrial-relations practices. Countries that have had 
the former and lagged in the development of the latter (such as Korea) have confronted 
substantial social pressures and instability. 
The need for rapid modernization of production and industrial-relations capacity is 
highlighted by recent developments in the auto industries in the new democracies. One 
illustration is the Eisenbach assembly plant located in what used to be East Germany. The plant 
is now owned by General Motors (as part of its Opel subsidiary) and is currently being retooled 
(Ingrassia and Aeppel 1992). Although the new Eisenbach plant is just in the start-up phase, it is 
already clear that General Motors is determined to use just-in-time inventories and other 
practices associated with "lean production." A critical part of these production techniques is 
team-based work organization and decentralized decision structures. It remains to be seen how 
well the new plant performs and how the work force reacts. Yet the important point is that this 
plant is being designed so as to meet modern automobile production and industrial-relations 
standards. The pressure for this approach comes from the fact that General Motors expects to 
export a significant share of the plant's output and from the fact that even the Eisenbach cars 
that will be sold in the former East Germany will confront intense competition from cars 
produced by other state-of-the-art competitors. 
A similar message comes from the Volga Auto Works in Tolgiatti, Russia (Uchitelle 1992). 
This plant has two sections: the side that produces cars for sale in Russia uses extremely old 
and inefficient machinery, while the part of the plant that produces cars for export uses 
modern technologies, including a large number of robots. Again, production oriented toward 
exports requires leapfrogging up to world standards. It is unclear if the "old" half of the Volga 
works will be able to survive as the Russian market is opened up to more competition. What is 
clear is that this plant, like so many other parts of Russian industry, must find a way to compete 
directly in world markets. Old technologies and old industrial relations will not suffice in the 
face of market pressures.  
 
The Change Under Way in Industrial-Relations Practice in the Advanced Economies 
 
A second key assumption of this paper is that there is enormous change under way in 
industrial relations in the advanced economies. While thirty years ago it was commonplace 
among social scientists to assume that in the long run other countries would converge on 
variants of the "most advanced" U.S. model of collective bargaining and industrial relations, this 
assumption has been swept aside by history. The rise and success of very different models in 
countries such as Japan and Germany has demonstrated both a cross-national diversity of 
stable industrial-relations patterns and new lessons regarding what does and does not work. 
The important starting point is a recognition of the impact of changing world markets 
and new technologies in driving industrial restructuring and industrial-relations transformation. 
Above all, perhaps, the rapid growth of Japanese economic strength, rooted in part in a 
successful system of enterprise unionism and shop-floor teamwork, has put pressure on firms 
in other countries to reorganize production and work and to seek some kind of "new industrial 
relations." Within Europe, not only the coming of Japanese competition but closer to home the 
relative success of German industry and industrial relations, along with the more recent 
"relaunching" of European economic integration, has pressured British, French, Italian, and 
Spanish (among other) firms to reorganize. Everywhere, intensified world market competition 
has called into question established relationships and ways of doing things and called forth 
managerial imperatives to raise productivity and product quality, achieve new flexibility, and 
cut costs. 
At the same time—and closely related—the past fifteen years have witnessed a rapid 
spread of new microelectronic technologies in the work place. "New production concepts," 
often based on the new technology, aim to make more flexible use of labor, both in the 
products produced and in the process. As managers demand more responsibility from (and 
sometimes even give "semi-autonomy" to) individual workers and groups of workers, 
traditional labor-management relationships are called into question. 
In some cases, employers have gone on the offensive against union influence that is 
perceived to defend rigidities in the work place and stand in the way of necessary work 
reorganization. In other cases, employers have sought a new collaborative relationship with 
entrenched unions; and sometimes the second strategy has followed the first. Unions, for their 
part, have in some cases fought against the changes and defended the traditional ways on 
which their power is based. But in other cases, unions have demonstrated a willingness to 
cooperate in new ways, both to save jobs and to promote the human-side benefits of more 
flexible work organization. And in some cases, unions have played a pro-active reformist role, 
pushing management toward new forms of organization, such as group work. In addition, the 
state, through public policy, has often played an important role (through regulation, 
deregulation, or other policy changes) in promoting industrial-relations reform. 
In this period of uncertainty, trial and error, and change, there is also a great deal of 
cross-national, inter-firm, and inter-union communication and exchange. The opportunity to 
learn and combine lessons from various versions of successful (if not "best") practices is one of 
the benefits of intense contemporary processes of economic globalization. 
 Nowhere is this need greater than among the emerging and unstable democracies of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We would like to emphasize at the outset, 
however, that it is not possible to transplant another model, either discrete elements or the 
model in its entirety. In every case, it is necessary to build on existing practices and institutions, 
or institutional remnants. How the lessons presented in this paper can be adapted for specific 
use in specific national settings is a matter for careful case-by-case study and experimentation. 
 
Basic Principles of Law and Institutions 
 
Modern industrial relations requires that workers be afforded the basic right to form unions, 
and those unions should be granted the right to bargain collectively with employers and to 
strike if a negotiated settlement is not reached. 
 
Why the Right to Strike and Collective Bargaining Are Necessary 
 
The social advantages gained from the provision of these rights are revealed in the 
experiences of the industrialized democratic countries. The advantages include the fact that 
workers are entitled to a say in the determination of their employment and working conditions. 
Not only is such input justified on grounds of rights, but in addition, contemporary experience 
shows that to compete in world markets requires the active participation and commitment of 
the work force in order to meet quality and product performance standards. 
There are also clear virtues derived from industrial-relations systems that give the 
parties involved in the production process direct involvement in the determination of work 
conditions and employment terms. Employers and workers and their representatives know 
their own problems best and can be remarkably adept at devising practical solutions to 
problems or conflicts. Interference by outside parties in the resolution of problems often leads 
to apparent solutions that prove unworkable or impractical in the long run. 
Furthermore, third-party interference eliminates the constructive learning the parties 
receive in problem resolution and identification as they work through their own problems. Even 
if a third party could impose a solution that solves a problem in the short term, this process 
prevents the parties from developing the capacity to solve their own problems. Thus, a clear 
advantage to collective bargaining is that it avoids a cycle of dependence on third-party 
interference. 
Experience in the industrialized democratic countries also shows that unions, the right 
to strike, and collective bargaining are more likely to produce outcomes that are acceptable to 
workers and employers as compared to solutions that are imposed by governments or other 
third parties. Not only are employers and workers more likely to develop solutions that meet 
their own needs, these parties are also more likely to feel a commitment to making such 
solutions work. Imposed employment terms, in contrast, are often resented and resisted, in 
part because the parties that must live with these terms had little say in their development.  
Thus the process through which employment terms are set is often as important as the actual 
terms themselves. Collective bargaining has the advantage of being a process that is "owned" 
by the parties involved. 
Since collective bargaining is a healthy process, it should be applied widely. This 
suggests that the right to strike should be granted in nearly all cases. There may arise some 
instances where an alternative to the right to strike is necessary, yet experience demonstrates 
that the use of strike alternatives should be limited. 
In the bargaining process, a very constructive role can be played by independent 
mediation entities in a modern industrial-relations system. The proper role of mediation is to 
facilitate communication between labor and management and to provide advice. For mediation 
to serve such a function, there must be a sufficiently large cadre of well-trained mediators who 
understand practical labor-relations issues. Countries that have recently experienced the 
spread of democratic political institutions especially need to devote resources toward the 
training of such mediators. 
There is also an extremely healthy role to be played by grievance procedures or labor 
courts that solve the problems that arise during the terms of contractual agreements. Research 
shows that grievance procedures can provide employee voice and thereby lower employee 
turnover as well as assist in the identification of problems and informal resolution of conflicts 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984). Successful grievance procedures are designed by the parties that 
directly use them and not by the government or other third parties. At the same time, as is the 
case with mediation, the successful operation of grievance arbitration requires the existence of 
arbitrators who are experienced and well versed in specific practical industrial problems. The 
government can play a role in furthering the development of a cadre of such arbitrators or 
assist in the creation of third-party bodies, such as the American Arbitration Association, that 
can facilitate the grievance arbitration process. 
In Europe, government-administered labor courts that resolve individual complaints are 
common. Labor courts, like grievance arbitration, can effectively settle problems, provide 
practical resolution of them, and avoid larger social conflicts. It is possible for an industrial-
relations system to contain both grievance arbitration and labor courts, yet most national 
industrial-relations systems emphasize one or the other. An advantage to labor courts is that 
they cover all employees, unorganized as well as organized. Furthermore, labor courts tend to 
give employees more direct control over the processing of their complaints. Grievance 
procedures, on the other hand, give more influence to the unions involved. In a grievance 
system it is the union and not the employee that owns the grievance, and the union thereby is 
empowered to decide whether or not to press a complaint to arbitration. 
There are some clear strengths of grievance procedures. They tend to be very 
responsive to the preferences of the parties, as they can be tailored to their desires and to the 
requirements in particular occupations or industries. Furthermore, the parties have more direct 
control over the design and operation of a grievance procedure and thereby gain a strong 
commitment to the outcomes of the grievance system. Yet grievance procedures have at times 
become cumbersome and fraught with delays. In the end, there are trade-offs involved in the 
design of complaint-resolution procedures and choices in their design. Our view is that a 
modern industrial-relations system should have either a grievance or a labor-court system or 
some combination of the two. 
 
Proper Union Roles 
 
The earlier discussion highlighted the pressing nature of current international 
competitive conditions. There is clearly much for employers and unions to focus on concerning 
how the work place can produce employment terms that are socially acceptable and products 
that are competitively successful. This does not imply that there is no role for unions to play as 
political actors or participants in political debate. It does suggest, however, that the 
representation of worker interests often requires unions to focus their attention on 
employment and workplace issues. 
It is also clear that society benefits from the presence of politically independent unions 
that are free from domination and government control. Such domination eliminates the 
democratic representation of worker wants and constructive employer-union interchange. The 
drawbacks of state domination of unions are many, including a violation of workers' rights. 
Furthermore, state-dominated unions or state-controlled industrial-relations systems tend to 
generate periodic explosive conflict. 
As representation and bargaining entities, unions should not serve functions that are 
properly the domain of government social-service institutions. For example, there are proper 
social-service needs in the areas of social pensions (e.g., social security) and vocational 
education that should be regulated and financed by national governments and/or regional 
governments. Unions are not only poor providers of such services, they can also become 
diverted away from the areas where they can make more substantial private and social 
contributions by pursuing social welfare provision activities. We do not intend to convey that 
there is no useful role to be played by unions in the provision of any social services. In some 
countries (e.g., Sweden), unions, for example, play a constructive role in the administration of 
unemployment benefits. And in many countries unions are effectively involved in vocational-
education programs. 
Unions should also not become the vehicle for the direct provision of consumer goods, 
such as housing or food distribution, as they did in the former Soviet Union. Not only are unions 
relatively inefficient as a distribution and pricing system, consumer-goods provision through the 
union or work place also unfairly and inefficiently ties workers to specific firms. Workers are 
unable to engage in necessary labor-market mobility if their housing, for example, is provided 
through the union or firm. The harmful effects of this sort of union role have been revealed in 
the rigidities apparent in the former Soviet states as they have struggled to create a more free-
flowing labor market and to move individuals into a private market economy. 
These concerns do not mean that unions should be blocked from addressing specific 
worker health or educational issues. Union-administered health and welfare funds have played 
constructive roles in many countries. The point is that social programs should be administered 
by governments and private programs should have narrower bounds and a narrower focus. In 
addition, as discussed above, consumer goods should be priced and allocated through markets 
and not through unions or other work-place institutions. 
 
Work-Place Representation 
 
There are great advantages to an industrial-relations framework that includes parallel 
representation at the work place through institutions such as works councils. In the most 
successful examples (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark), basic pay and work standards are 
set in collective bargaining at an industry level (for an entire industry or group of industries, 
either regionally or nationally). Plant and firm-level works councils, composed of elected blue- 
and white-collar representatives, enforce the collective-bargaining agreements and, in addition, 
engage in ongoing discussion and negotiation of plant-specific issues. Works councils typically 
have formal rights, backed up by national legislation, to extensive information regarding 
company plans as well as to consultation and in some cases (usually personnel issues) to veto 
rights in management decision making. 
In Germany, the works councils have integrated employee representatives into 
management decision making and provided a flexible instrument for restructuring and 
adaptation. Although works councils have imposed some external rigidity on firms (it is more 
difficult to hire and especially to fire), this has been more than compensated for by added 
internal flexibility (Streeck 1984a). Because they are able to negotiate relative employment 
security for the work force, works councils are more willing to accept internal flexibility of 
deployment (Katz and Sabel 1985). Works councils also push firms to increase in-house training 
and the hiring of apprentices; because firms are less able to hire and fire from outside, they 
have a strong incentive to pursue internal labor-market strategies and to move into high value-
added product markets. 
Although management decision making can be slowed in the legally established, 
consensus-building process, managers have important allies in the works councils to smooth 
implementation once decisions are reached. Works councils at large plants often take on co-
management functions, relieving management of important personnel responsibilities. 
Works councils bargain for pay upgrades and bonuses, often on the basis of firm 
performance. They negotiate the terms of rationalization and the introduction of new 
technology, protecting employee interests as well as providing useful employee input into 
production and work reorganization (Turner 1991). Works councils provide a voice for white-
collar employees, who are traditionally underrepresented in industrial-relations systems; and 
the councils provide some representation for employees even where unions are weak or 
absent. 
Where works councils function well, they contribute to a virtuous circle that includes 
employee voice, especially on issues of immediate interest such as personnel and organization, 
comprehensive representation, labor-management cooperation (since the works council 
identifies with the interests of the firm), high trust based on joint efforts, flexibility in labor 
deployment, and high productivity and high product quality (Streeck 1984a). These plant-level 
institutions of codetermination make it possible for works councils, unions (often working 
through the works councils), and managers to build successful "productivity coalitions." It is 
important to emphasize, however, that the virtuous circle is possible not just in isolated cases 
(as in the United States and Britain) but throughout the economy only because works councils 
are established and defined in national legislation. 
The parallel representation afforded by works councils is also buttressed, and made 
more successful, by arrangements at the strategic level. The latter include both collective 
bargaining between industrial unions and employer associations and union-works council 
participation (also mandated by law in Germany) on company supervisory boards. Other 
features of the German system help to make the works councils successful, including the 
presence of strong unions and employment security. 
Although works councils are not a part of Japanese industrial relations, enterprise 
unions at large firms fulfill some of the same functions. These include co-management, 
facilitating labor-management cooperation, building productivity coalitions, receiving extensive 
information regarding company plans, consultation, and giving a voice to white-collar concerns. 
Enterprise unions are also integrated to some extent into management decision making 
through firm-level bodies, such as joint labor-management committees. But as in the U.S. case, 
this form of plant-level representation has no legal backing in formal participation rights and is 
weak or nonexistent for the majority of work places that are nonunion. 
Below we examine in detail some of the basic requirements of any industrial-relations 
system. We build upon our earlier discussion of the basic principles that should be followed in 
industrial relations. 
 
Wage-Setting and Bargaining Structures 
 
Two related issues that are of central importance in industrial relations in any country 
are the structure of wage setting and bargaining (the latter is referred to as bargaining 
structure). Normally, there is a close connection between these matters, since wages are set as 
part of the normal bargaining that occurs between employers and unions. 
 
Bargaining Structure 
 
A critical choice in the process of collective bargaining is the degree to which the 
bargaining structure is centralized. The most decentralized case is where wages and other 
terms in the labor contract are set in a contract that covers only the workers in a single plant 
(or a subset of the work force in a plant). The most extreme case of centralized bargaining (and 
wage setting) occurs during incomes policies when a government imposes pay standards that 
apply to all workers in the economy. Where there is no government-sanctioned incomes policy, 
the most common "centralized" bargaining structure occurs when a large employer association 
negotiates with a union (or federation of unions) and sets wages and other employment terms 
for all the unionized employees in all the firms that are members of this employer association. 
 
The Disadvantages of Fragmented Bargaining Structures 
 
The challenge in emerging democracies is to develop wage-setting and bargaining 
structures that meet the parties' needs and the pressures of international competitive forces. 
For instance, highly fragmented bargaining units should be avoided. A number of problems 
have appeared in industrialized countries in situations where bargaining units were too 
fragmented and numerous. In Britain, for example, craft bargaining is said to be an impediment 
to integrative problem solving and  the effective introduction of technological change (Ulman 
1968). A large number of bargaining units also contributes to inflationary pressures through the 
promotion of wage imitation and leapfrogging across jurisdictions (Flanagan, Soskice, and 
Ulman 1983). 
 
The Virtues of Coordinated Bargaining 
 
One potential solution to the problem of bargaining-unit fragmentation is to conduct 
wage bargaining at the level of industrial sectors. In Germany, for example, bargaining occurs 
within sixteen major industrial sectors. The German structure has the advantage of inducing 
unions to consider broad worker economic interests. So, for example, because unions in 
Germany often include workers from a variety of companies and industries, there has been less 
trade protectionist sentiment within German unions since these unions often include members 
whose livelihood depends on the export success of their employers. In this way, particular firm 
or industry interests become muted in the bargaining process (Streeck 1984a). The 
coordination across work groups provided in the German bargaining structure meshes with 
other aspects of German industrial relations to produce what has been called a "coordinated 
market economy" (Soskice 1990). 
Another successful alternative bargaining structure is enterprise bargaining of the sort 
that occurs in Japan. The advantage of enterprise bargaining is that it is very responsive to the 
economic conditions facing particular firms. The potential problem of inflationary leapfrogging 
across enterprise unions is dampened in the Japanese system through the Simultaneous 
occurrence of wage bargaining, which occurs in the "Spring Offensive" each year. In the annual 
offensive, the various enterprise unions communicate extensively with one another and often 
discuss their wage demands with their respective union federations. In this process, wage 
demands are coordinated and take account of macroeconomic circumstances. Japanese 
enterprise wage bargaining also has the advantage of often including a sizable share of pay 
increases in the form of annual bonuses that are influenced by the economic performance of 
the firm. The advantage of linking pay directly to economic performance through this and other 
alternative techniques is discussed more extensively below. 
 
 
The Virtues of Annual Pay Agreements 
 
Both German and Japanese wage bargaining have revealed relatively little inflationary 
tendencies. This appears to follow, in part, from the fact that in both countries most wage 
bargaining occurs on an annual basis, namely, the wage terms of labor contracts extend for only 
one year. In addition, in these countries there are various processes that provide coordination 
across wage bargains. These coordinating mechanisms seem to be especially critical in avoiding 
inflationary pressures (Soskice 1990). 
In contrast, multiyear labor contracts in the United States (and some other countries) 
reduce the influence of contemporary macroeconomic factors on wage negotiations. In this 
way, multiyear contracts contribute to wage rigidity, a particularly worrisome problem during 
economic downturns (Wachter 1976). A countervailing advantage to multiyear contracts comes 
from the fact that they limit the possibility of the costly strikes that might ensue in more 
frequent bargaining, in effect, by reducing the costs and risks of bargaining. Yet the inflationary 
tendencies inherent in multiyear contracts appear to outweigh this virtue. 
 
The Occupational Scope of Bargaining Structure 
 
Another important aspect of bargaining structure concerns which employees are 
included in unions and other representation structures. In Japanese enterprise bargaining, 
white-collar employees of the firm below the executive rank are included as members of the 
union. In Germany, white-collar employees often press their interest through their participation 
in the codetermination processes, which provide these employees with the right to 
proportional representation in the works councils and in the election of supervisory board 
members. The provision of representation rights to white-collar employees is another aspect of 
bargaining structure worthy of attention. Both the German and the Japanese methods of 
providing white-collar employees with representation rights are commendable. An important 
industrial-relations task confronting developing countries is to avoid representation structures 
that only include "blue-collar" employees. 
 
Recent Movement in More Decentralized Bargaining Structures in Advanced Industrialized 
Countries 
 
In recent years in very many industrialized countries there has been movement toward 
more decentralized pay-setting and bargaining structures (Katz 1992). In the United States this 
involves the breakdown of multi-company bargaining (or the erosion of the extent of such 
bargaining) in the trucking, steel, and coal industries. In Sweden, in 1992 employers refused to 
engage in the traditional centralized bargaining. In Australia, the traditional heavy centralization 
in wage setting (the national "award" system) has been weakening even during a period when 
the government and the unions have engaged in a social contract. In some countries, such as 
Germany and Belgium, formal wage-setting structures have not broken down and become 
more decentralized. Nevertheless, in nearly all countries there has been a shift toward 
bargaining-structure decentralization through the elevation in the importance of, and an 
increase in the variation of, the outcomes of plant-level bargaining. Greater variation appears 
particularly in the work rules and work practices agreed to by union and company officials at 
the plant level. 
There are many reasons for the recent decentralization of bargaining and wage-setting 
structures. The pressures of heightened international competition, increased volatility and 
uncertainty regarding economic trends, and the increased flexibility required in the face of 
more fragmented product markets have all contributed to bargaining-structure 
decentralization. Labor and management have turned to more decentralized bargaining as a 
way to develop contract terms that respond to their needs and economic pressures. More 
decentralized bargaining also fits well with the shift toward the new industrial-relations 
practices, such as the team systems discussed later in this paper. 
 
Work-Place Issues 
 
The relative success of Japanese and German industry over the past two decades has 
brought home the virtues of employee and union participation at various levels of management 
decision making. As changing world markets and new information technologies have increased 
the need for functional flexibility in the work place, production requirements can no longer be 
met only by armies of semiskilled workers following orders. 
 
Recent Restructuring in Industrial Relations 
 
In some countries, recent changes amount to a fundamental transformation in industrial 
relations. Aspects of this transformation have appeared in virtually all countries. 
There are many dimensions to this transformation, including a shift in the focus of 
industrial-relations activity away from the "collective-bargaining" to the "strategic" and "work-
place" levels (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). In contrast to the traditional arms-length and 
formal nature of collective bargaining, the "new industrial-relations system" involves more 
continuous and informal relations between workers and managers (Windolf 1989). The new 
system often includes contingent compensation, team systems of work organization, 
employment security programs, and enhanced worker and union participation in decision 
making. 
 
Contingent Compensation 
 
Contingent compensation links pay directly to firm or worker performance. The virtue of 
more contingent compensation comes from the fact that it provides responsiveness in wages to 
current economic circumstances. As Weitzman argues, if pay responds quickly to economic 
conditions, economic systems are able to lessen the need for large quantity adjustments in 
employment and output and thereby become less prone to stagflation and related 
macroeconomic problems (Weitzman 1984). As discussed earlier, the presence of annual pay 
agreements rather than multiyear pay agreements adds a significant degree of responsiveness. 
Yet it appears that economies benefit further from the presence of direct linkages between pay 
and measures of firm and/or worker performance. 
The use of annual bonuses that provide one-third of total wage earnings in Japan 
provides a virtuous high degree of pay responsiveness to economic conditions. It should be 
noted that for these bonuses to provide a macroeconomic stabilization function, they must vary 
with firm performance, which does occur in Japan (Hashimoto 1979). Other systems would be 
well served to develop the mechanisms providing pay responsiveness that fit within their own 
industrial-relations systems. 
In many countries there has been recent movement toward the use of pay procedures 
that provide such a contingent linkage. In some cases this has been introduced through profit 
sharing or stock ownership (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986,134). On the shop floor, more 
contingent pay has spread through the introduction of gain-sharing programs that tie worker 
pay to work area or plant performance and through pay-for-knowledge that provides pay 
increases as the employee proves competence in a wider variety of jobs. (In the past, a worker's 
wage was often set strictly on the basis of the job classification or job tasks.) 
 
Team Systems 
 
A second important innovation of many new work systems is the shift to various forms 
of shop-floor and office teamwork (Windolf 1989). Traditional assembly-line organization based 
on isolated work stations, it turns out, contains built-in limitations on worker participation and 
flexibility. Traditional "fragmented" job assignments limit worker contributions to production 
improvements, commitment to product quality, and capacity for flexible deployment in the 
work place. Japanese team organization, by contrast, including cross-training, job rotation, 
integration of tasks, and regular team meetings, has demonstrated a dramatic potential for 
productivity and product-quality gains. 
In response, many employers in manufacturing industries in the United States, Great 
Britain, and elsewhere have moved to introduce team forms of organization, with varying 
degrees of success. The exact form of team systems varies across firms, industries, and 
countries (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Turner 1991). Team members often take on some 
inspection, material-handling, repair, and housekeeping tasks. In the more advanced teams, 
workers assume responsibility for some production-control and planning tasks, and hourly (in 
some cases unionized) team leaders perform job responsibilities formerly under the control of 
supervisors. 
At the same time, unions in Germany, especially IG Metal, have been promoting "group 
work," both for its production improvements and as a more humanistic form of organization 
(Turner 1991, 111-17). The German version places an emphasis on broad work assignments, 
broadened responsibility and autonomy for the groups, as well as enhanced skills training and 
broad upgrading of group members. 
Team or group systems are thus most likely to work well in countries such as Japan and 
Germany that already have strong institutional underpinnings for training and for worker-union 
participation. In other countries, it is necessary to establish such underpinnings to promote 
cooperation, participation, and training along with the introduction of more flexible team or 
group forms of organization. The necessary underpinnings can range from joint labor-
management committees at the plant level to national legislation to promote training and to 
establish some nationally appropriate version of works councils. 
Participation 
 
A third essential element of innovative work systems and "new industrial relations" 
consists of mechanisms for employee and union participation. The elaboration of team systems 
brings with it wider roles for hourly workers as they become involved in production-control 
tasks. Team systems and the administration of new employment security are also often 
associated with a broadening of worker and union involvement in strategic business decisions. 
In part this strategic involvement arises as a consequence of the major corporate 
reorganizations that confront the work force. After watching plants close and work outsourced, 
workers and unions have sought avenues to affect the decisions that weigh so heavily on their 
future. 
Strategic participation by workers and unions also expands by the very nature of the 
bargain being drafted in the new industrial-relations system. Workers and unions are often 
initially hesitant to adopt more contingent pay, teams, and other more-flexible work rules. They 
fear both the potentially lower and more volatile pay associated with contingent compensation 
and the potential increase in work pace and loss in protections associated with the modification 
of work practices. In response, labor has asked for greater shop-floor and strategic involvement 
in decisions along with employment-security provisions as both a form of compensation and a 
form of insurance for the protection of employee and union rights. In some plants in the United 
States, union officers serve on "administrative" committees that direct plant operations. GM's 
Saturn plant represents an extreme case. At Saturn, the president of the UAW local is a 
member of the executive management committee. This committee decides matters that 
include picking vendors to supply parts. 
Participation can be structured in a number of different ways, including works councils 
established by law, informally established cooperation through enterprise unions, joint labor-
management committees established through collective bargaining, and quality circles and 
suggestion programs in union and nonunion work places. 
It is important to note that where unions are present, they need to be fully aboard and 
supportive of the introduction of new work organization. Management strategies that divide 
the local union to force teamwork on a reluctant work force are unlikely to work (Turner 1991). 
Institutional arrangements that ensure union participation, at least at some level, can facilitate 
the labor-management cooperation necessary for the high-trust, innovative modern work 
place. 
While successful in Germany and Japan, the patchy track record in the United States, 
Great Britain, and France suggests that participation requires either legal backing or substantial 
protections and encouragement throughout the firm. Workers and unions need institutions 
with clear rules and protections to allow them to participate in firm decision-making processes, 
and management needs thorough-going reform from the top of the organization to the bottom 
to instill commitment for employee participation. Both sides need training in participatory 
processes and trust building to set successful participation in motion. 
The role of middle management is especially important in this regard. It is here that 
employee participation is most often perceived as threatening to established prerogatives, and 
it is at this level that participation often fails or is sabotaged. Yet middle managers have a 
crucial role to play in participatory processes and can find their influence within the 
organization enhanced rather than diminished. They therefore need extra training in the 
management of participation, along with special encouragement, protections, and clarity about 
their own (often quite new) roles. 
Participation is most likely to succeed and to be more than temporary if it occurs and is 
reinforced at all three levels of labor-management interaction in the firm: at the strategic level, 
in negotiation and agreement between top management and union leadership; at the 
functional level, in collective-bargaining agreements and contract enforcement; and at the 
work-place level, in team or group organization and other meaningful participation programs 
that have the full support of the organization and its management. National labor policy can 
play an especially important role in encouraging the spread of participation, through efforts 
ranging from education, to specific incentives, to enabling or even mandating legislation. 
 
Employment Security 
 
The generation of employment commitment to company goals requires that employees 
face the prospect of continued employment with their firms. This is particularly important in 
light of the spread of team systems and the development of more firm-specific skills. In the 
presence of these skills, employees become less attractive to the external labor market 
(Osterman 1988). If employees do not then receive more security from the firm, they may well 
be reluctant to acquire more-extensive skills and training or to participate in the sort of shop-
floor decision making that is so crucial to the maintenance of competitive and high-quality 
products. 
Employment security can come in a variety of forms. In Germany, there has been a 
longstanding and successful requirement that if firms seek to reduce the size of their work 
force, they must first negotiate social plans with their works council. These social plans then 
outline the compensation received by redundant workers, establish guidelines concerning 
which workers are to be laid off, and create other adjustment strategies. As a result, the 
German system has also shown relatively less use of layoffs as an adjustment strategy in the 
face of output declines. The "internal flexibility" provided in the German system through broad 
jobs and flexible work rules has created the possibility of more internal adjustments rather than 
recourse to extensive external adjustments through layoffs (Sengenberger and Kohler 1987). 
In Japan, there is heavy use of the "lifetime employment principle." A relatively high 
percentage of employees spend long careers, often their whole career, with one firm (Cole 
1979). The key is that employees are broadly trained and work rules are relatively flexible. This 
makes it possible for firms to make internal adjustments to respond to reductions in product 
demand. These internal adjustments include moving workers across parts of the enterprise, or 
in some cases even "loaning" workers to other firms. (This occurred during the mid- 1970s at 
Mazda when their rotary car did not sell well. Some workers were sent into repair shops or out 
as sales staff while others were "loaned" to other firms in growing industries.) 
The use of internal movements is, of course, not without its limits. In Japan, lifetime 
employment is afforded to "permanent" employees but is not provided to "temporary" 
employees and is more common in large firms. In the German system as well, the use of foreign 
workers (particularly in the 1960s and 1970s) on limited-term employment contracts also 
helped facilitate the less-frequent layoff of native German workers (Streeck 1984a). 
In a number of countries in recent years, there have been a variety of new employment-
security programs ranging from explicit employment guarantees to retraining and income 
support. The negotiation of such programs typically is linked to the introduction of more 
flexible work rules and other work practices associated with team systems. 
There appears to be a direct link between participation, employment security, and 
work-force flexibility within the firm. To the extent that workers participate in decision-making 
processes, they become more flexible in what they are able and willing to do in production 
processes. And to the extent that they have employment security, employees are often willing 
to go along with even the most radical shop-floor innovations. 
The United States, Great Britain, and France, among other countries, have weak 
participatory traditions, with industrial-relations systems that do little to encourage either 
participation or internal flexibility. Historically, managers act ("no one tells me how to run my 
business"), unions react (and often fight rearguard actions against innovation), and workers are 
supposed to do what they are told (but often sabotage innovation in more or less subtle ways). 
In these countries, a major challenge is to reform industrial-relations practices so that new 
participation and flexibility are possible in line with the demands of contemporary world 
markets. In the face of entrenched institutions and practices, however, such reform is quite 
difficult (see the Milkman paper in this volume). Reform is under way in all three countries, but 
the pace is halting, and the failures are many. 
The crucial dilemma facing firms, unions, and policy makers outside Japan and Germany 
is not how to import foreign models but how to adapt and reform established institutions and 
practices to achieve the necessary participation and flexibility. Our point is that labor and 
management should try to find mechanisms that fit within their respective system to make use 
of internal flexibility as an alternative to external employment adjustments. At the same time, it 
is unreasonable to believe that all external employment adjustments can or should be avoided. 
The elimination of the possibility of layoffs can produce enormous inefficiencies and rigidities 
(and it has done so in some countries). 
 Firm-level employment-security practices can assist employees in making economic 
transitions and provide internal mobility. At the same time, governments should play a role in 
providing inter-firm and career mobility, particularly during periods of slack economic growth 
and in regions or industries that confront abrupt employment declines. In Sweden, for example, 
there is a long history of successful "active labor-market policies," which have provided such 
assistance and mobility to workers (Meidner and Anderson 1973). 
 
Training and Work-Force Skill and Career Development 
 
New work-place systems in the 1990s and beyond, based on such attributes as shop-
floor and office teamwork discussed above, employee participation, and career development in 
internal labor markets, cannot succeed without broadly skilled workers capable of continual 
learning. 
 
 
 
 
The Need for Greater Investment in Training 
 
 While traditional mass production may have required armies of semiskilled workers 
engaged in repetitive tasks, backed up by the few skilled workers necessary to repair and 
maintain machinery, modern production requires versatile, flexible employees who can 
perform various tasks and who can "participate" and contribute to production practices in a 
pro-active way. 
The economic environment has put a premium on industry's ability to use batch rather 
than traditional mass-production techniques and to shift more rapidly across the types of 
products produced. This has generated new demands on industry's training procedures. 
(Evidence that the level and quality of training exerts a sizable independent impact on 
productivity is provided in MacDuffie and Kochan [1991]). More flexible manufacturing 
processes often entail the introduction of sophisticated electronically directed machinery (such 
as programmable machine tools) and automated storage and retrieval systems. These systems 
can be most effectively operated by a work force well informed about fairly advanced 
mathematics and statistics. The use of team systems fits into this network of new production 
techniques as the organizational vehicle through which workers take on the responsibilities of 
monitoring and often directing quality-control and production processes. 
The training needs generated by these production and control systems go beyond 
traditional requirements. Not only must the work force have quantitative analytic skills, they 
must be skilled in the use of computers and other electronic technologies. Furthermore, since 
team systems are often associated with the new work practices, the work force needs 
communication and group skills to facilitate the operation and coordination of team tasks. 
Factory studies show increasing percentages of skilled workers, many of them newly cross-
trained (in additional skills), accompanied by declining percentages of the traditional 
semiskilled workers (see, for example, Milkman and Pullman 1991). Even the latter require new 
training in organizational skills (for teamwork, participation, job rotation) and/or more 
substantive skills development for the monitoring of expensive microelectronic- run machinery 
(Kern and Schumann 1984). 
The problem for firms and governments is how to build up the necessary pool of skilled 
workers, how to build up the abilities and flexibility of the less skilled, and how to develop 
reliable structures and incentives for continual training and retraining. In this section, we 
consider the need for union involvement and the virtues of "productivity coalitions," the 
successful German apprenticeship system, successful Japanese internal labor markets, and the 
need for social and educational policies that are linked to and reinforce modern skill 
requirements and industrial relations. 
 
The Advantages of Union Involvement in Training Design and Implementation 
 
Union involvement in the promotion and operation of training programs can be a 
valuable asset in successful up-skilling programs. At the firm level, such involvement can 
encourage cooperative labor-management relations and form part and parcel of the building of 
a "productivity coalition" (Streeck 1984b) that includes management, union, and work force. 
Local unions and/or works councils are often well placed to help run training programs in a way 
that appears fair and wins the trust of the work force. In addition, such local representative 
bodies may be well placed to know about missing skills and training requirements as well as the 
capacities and potential of individual employees. Works councils at large firms in Germany 
make an important contribution in this regard; enterprise unions in Japan to some extent play a 
parallel role. 
In contrast to earlier efforts focused on management education, the new training 
programs often focus on occupational and "blue-collar" employees. As a consequence it now 
makes more sense for these training programs to be managed jointly by unions and 
management. 
 
The German Training System 
 
Union involvement in the promotion and operation of training programs can be a 
valuable asset in successful up-skilling programs. At the firm level, such involvement can 
encourage cooperative labor-management relations and form part and parcel of the building of 
a "productivity coalition" (Streeck 1984b) that includes management, union, and work force. 
Local unions and/or works councils are often well placed to help run training programs in a way 
that appears fair and wins the trust of the work force. In addition, such local representative 
bodies may be well placed to know about missing skills and training requirements as well as the 
capacities and potential of individual employees. Works councils at large firms in Germany 
make an important contribution in this regard; enterprise unions in Japan to some extent play a 
parallel role. In contrast to earlier efforts focused on management education, the new training 
programs often focus on occupational and "blue-collar" employees. As a consequence it now 
makes more sense for these training programs to be managed jointly by unions and 
management. 
 Because unions are broadly integrated into vocational education, they are committed to 
promoting a highly skilled work force. This commitment extends from the national and regional 
levels, where unions help set recruitment targets based on projected skill needs, to the plant 
and firm levels, where works councils press management to hire more apprentices. The 
British/American image of craft unions that restrict entry to the skilled trades (to maintain 
status and pay levels for the already skilled) is contradicted by the German picture of unions 
that actively promote widespread skills training. This is due in part to the industrial union 
structure of representation; equally important is the top-to-bottom integration of unions into 
the running of the vocational education system. 
For individual workers, this system appears to work well. Fully two-thirds of the German 
work force has either completed an apprenticeship or graduated from a vocational school, and 
a large majority of these latter complete apprenticeships. 
Employers have strong incentives to participate in apprenticeship hiring. The in-school 
training that apprentices receive is government funded; and apprentice wages, paid by 
employers, are low. The employer thus provides on-the-job training and in return gets 
inexpensive and often energetic and flexible young labor. In addition, the employer gets a 
multiyear period in which to work with and observe the young employee as a potential 
permanent, skilled hire. For employers as a group (and firms participate in the tripartite 
governing bodies through employer associations), the national system of apprentice training 
and vocational education assures a steady flow of skills on the labor market. 
In auto plants, for example, there is often a surplus of skills. Semiskilled positions are in 
many cases occupied by workers who have completed apprenticeships but were unable to (or 
chose not to) find a position in their trade. These workers have proven ripe for further on-the-
job training and added job responsibilities beyond what a traditional semiskilled position would 
require. Union demands in the German auto industry for shop-floor "group work" are based in 
part on the desire to offer new training and autonomy to these floating but essentially skilled 
workers. And the ability of German employers to develop and offer intermediate positions, 
such as "equipment monitors" for robots and other microelectronic-run machinery, is also 
based on the high skills base of the work force. 
The nationwide tripartite comprehensive system of vocational education has often been 
cited as a major factor accounting for Germany's industrial success. A highly skilled labor force 
is clearly a central component of the virtuous circle that has pushed German firms upmarket 
into "diversified quality production" (Sorge and Streeck 1988). 
 
Extensive Japanese On-the-Job Training 
 
In contrast to the German system, the Japanese rely relatively little on formal 
apprentices and yet accomplish extensive training inside firms. The Japanese production system 
includes jobs that are relatively broadly defined, and workers are often rotated across jobs 
throughout their careers. These production techniques are facilitated by the extensive amounts 
of on-the-job training received by workers. In addition, skill acquisition and work-place 
flexibility are assisted by the high levels and quality of education provided in the Japanese 
primary and secondary schools. The provision of extensive on-the-job training in Japan is linked 
to other features of the Japanese industrial-relations system. The long tenure of workers in 
firms provides strong incentives to both workers and firms for investments in training by 
guaranteeing returns on training investments. In addition, the heavy reliance on seniority-based 
promotion makes job rotation easy and thereby facilitates training across tasks (Cole 1979). 
First-line supervisors in Japan commonly plan workers' training and career progression 
carefully. Some of this planning and heavy first-line supervisor involvement takes place as part 
of the merit pay and performance appraisal that covers "blue-collar" workers in Japanese firms 
(Koike 1988). Thus extensive investments in training do not occur accidentally but rather are 
linked closely to other practices common to Japanese firms. 
 
Conclusions 
 
History has shown that there are certain key moments of transition in industrial-
relations systems, after which they get set and are hard to modify. Often these key moments 
are a result of legislative changes (e.g., the establishment of the National Labor Relations Act 
and the emergence of public-sector unions after the burgeoning of public-sector legislation in 
the United States). Other factors are also important in facilitating industrial-relations system 
change, such as important historical or economic junctures (e.g., the postwar reconstruction in 
Germany and Japan were significant moments of industrial-relations transition). 
The recent movements toward democracy and markets in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union present an opportunity for major transitions in industrial relations. A key 
question is whether these countries will take advantage of this opportunity. 
Another important issue is the need to recognize that various industrial-relations 
policies and procedures fit together and reinforce one another (i.e., the systematic nature of 
industrial relations). For example, changes in pay systems have implications for work 
organization. Work organization, meanwhile, has strong implications for employee participation 
and skill development. For the newly emerging democracies it is not just a question of choosing 
elements of industrial-relations policy from the experience of the leading industrial countries 
and making incremental adjustments but rather of striving for the reconstruction of entire 
systems so that various new policies will fit together. 
It is not suggested here that the emerging democracies adopt an industrial-relations 
system from any of the industrialized countries in its entirety, since systems must reflect the 
unique institutional background, politics, and history of each country. Most importantly, we 
emphasize the necessity of coordinating and integrating industrial-relations policy with other 
economic, social, educational, and legal policies. The emerging democracies must develop their 
own unique institutional mechanisms to achieve these goals. 
While it is clear that many often far-reaching changes are necessary in industrial-
relations practices, the process through which change occurs is also important. The process of 
change has to be managed so as to provide for the active participation of the parties. 
Participation can help to achieve the necessary popular acceptance of changes. Experience has 
consistently shown that the top-down introduction of change in industrial relations (whether it 
is policy at the national level or systems at the company level) fails without popular acceptance 
of the need for change and participation in the change effort. 
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